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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTArl 
UTArl RESTAURANI ASSOCIATION, 
3 Utah non-profit corporation, 
and ANihONY'S INC., a Utah 
corµoration, dba Anthony's 
Restaurant, Case No. 19213 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
-vs-
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RE.SPO~DENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the 
District Court of Davis County. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOwER COURT 
The District Court of Davis County ruled that the "Food 
SLlrvices Establishment Permit Fee Schedule" imposed by tlie 
Appellant W3S invalid, restrained the Appellant from attempting 
to impose 3ny charges pursuant to that Schedule, and Ordered 
the Appellant to return any payments theretofore received from 
~~;persons pursuant to that Schedule CR. 250). 
l'<ATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant does not challenge the determination of the 
Court that the Schedule and the fees imposed thereunder are 
invalid, but seeks a declaration from this Court that the 
Appellant has the authority to impose an inspection fee if such 
inspection fee is subsequently adopted pursuant to the 
procedures set forth in Section 26-24-20, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As reflected above, the Appellant failed to make any 
Findings of Fact as required by Section 26-24-20, Utah Code 
Annotated <1953>, as amended. The record failea to establish 
any basis for the establishment of the Fees set forth in the 
Fee Schedule, even as "informal" findings. However, at the 
September 7, 1982 meeting, it was reflecteu that Mr. Harvey 
stated that the cost of administering the entire food service 
program (not just inspections) of the Appellant was 
approximately $53,000 and that the Fee Schedule proposed would 
generate approximately $16,000. It was further reflected that 
the health department collects about $6,000 per year from food 
handlers' tests, that one-fourth of the budget was covered by 
mill levy, and that there were various other programs that 
bring in revenue to supplement the costs of the program 
CR. 133). 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, after 
determining that the Appellant had failed to comply with the 
statutory requirements in attempting to impose the aforesaid 
Fee Schedule, the lower Court further found that the Appellant 
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was acting in excess of its statutory authority in attempting 
to impose the type of fees involved in this matter. 
Additionally, the Court found that the Fee Schedule, in 
reality, amounted to the attempted imposition of a tax, rather 
than a "fee", thereby renoering the attempted imposition of the 
charges under that Schedule invalid. Finally, the lower Court 
determir.J that the Davis County Board of health did not have 
the authority to assess a "fee schedule" such as the one in 
this case (rt. 243-247). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TtlE JUDGME~T Of THE DISrRICT COURT IS 
MJT COl'IT£ST"-D BY THi, APP£LLANT Al'D, 1tlERErORE, 
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The Appellant has taken a rather unique approach on 
this matter in that it is now seeking only an advisory opinion 
from this Court. As earlier reflected, the Judgment of the 
lower Court merely found that the "Fee Schedule" of the 
Aprellant was invalid and that no charges could validly be 
imposed thereunder. That Judgment is properly supported by 
unchallenged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
~µp~llant is now attempting to appeal, not from that final 
Judgment but, rather, from certain of the lower Court's 
t1ndings ana conclusions which Appellant feels were erroneous, 
but which would not affect the Judgment. Notwithstanding the 
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fact that the issues reflected in the Appellant's Brief are 
ones which the Respondent would also wish to see put to rest, 
it is respectfully submitted that such advisory opinions are 
not the function of this Court and, since the Judgment of the 
lower Court is not challenged, this appeal should properly be 
dismissed or the Judgment of the lower Court summarily 
affirmed. 
As hereinafter reflected, the Respondents contend that 
the Court not only entered a correct Judgment but also entered 
findings and conclusions relative to this matter, all of which 
were correct. 
POINT II 
THE DISfHICT COUR1 COKRECTLY DETERMlNSC THAT TH~ 
APPELLANT HAS NO SfATUTORi AUTH0R1Ii 
TO ESTABLISH AN l~~PECTION F~~ RE~ULAfIN~ 
FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMEN1S. 
The Appellant relies, for its power to assess the fees 
involved in this matter, on Section 26-24-14, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as amended, which merely provides: 
"A local health department, shall have in 
addition to all other powers and duties imposed on it, 
the following powers and duties: 
* * * 
(14) Establish and collect arpropriate fees, to 
accept, use and administer all federal, state , or 
private donations or grants of funds. 
(emphasis addredl. 
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The Appellant maintains that, under this section, 
combined with Sections 26-24-3 and 26-24-8, Utah Code Annotatea 
~· as amended, it has been granted jurisdiction for 
sanitation and health matters throughout the incorporated and 
unincorporated areas of the County and has been authorized and 
directed by the legislature to impose such "user fees" as it 
may desire on businesses, such as the restaurants or food 
service establishments. !Appellant's Brief, p. SJ. However, 
while the legislature has specifically authorized some agencies 
to assess "user fees", it has, at the same time, placed guarded 
restrictions upon the imposition of those fees. Even in the 
sam 0 act as that which established the local health 
deparLoents, the legislature allowed the State Department of 
Health to impose such fees only after providing, at Section 
26-1-6, Utah Code Annotated 11953), as amended, as follows: 
"The department may adopt a schedule of fees 
that may be assessed for services rendered by the 
department, provided that such fees shall be reasonable 
and fair and shall be submitted to and approved by the 
legislature as part of the department's annual 
appropriations request. " 
It is respectfully submitted that it would be patently 
unr 0 asonable to presume that the legislature would have 
intended to give the local department of health carte blanche 
f~r the imposition of user fees at the same time they were 
Leing so careful to limit the powers of the State Department of 
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Health to impose such fees. Rather, it is much more reasonable 
to assume that the provision regarding the imposition of fees 
by the local department was merely intended to grant powers 
similar to those granted to other governmental bodies to impose 
the usual types of fees such as for the cost of preparing 
certificates, copying fees, and other unusual services which 
may be sr.cifically requested by a given party and which do not 
benefit the public in general. 
There is no question but that, under the Local nealth 
Department Act, the legislature gave certain responsibilities 
to the local departments of health to make investigations and 
inspections for the health and welfare of the general populace 
of the county, including the power to formulate rules and 
regulations for the promotion of public health, which are 
necessary and consistent with the legislation and its intent, 
and which, once properly adopted, would then have the effect of 
law. This does not change, however, the fact that there is no 
specific statutory authority for the type of "fees" the 
Appellant sought to impose in this matter for the purpose of 
transfering those costs of protecting the public health to a 
limited class of taxpayers. 
The lower Court, contrary to the contentions of the 
Appellant, did not state that the Appellant did not have the 
authority to pass a law assessing a fee (Appellant's Brief, 
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p. 9). The Court merely determined that the Appellant did not 
have the authority to assess a "Fee Schedule" such as that in 
this case for food service inspections. (R. 247 J. It did not 
d~ny its right to impose fees for minor items such as preparing 
certificates, copying fees, and other similar fees for specific 
services rendered to particular persons for their specific 
benefit, such as have been traditionally imposed by 
governmental bodies, as reflected in Section 26-24-14, Utah 
Code Annotated <1953), as amended. (R. 245-246). 
Appellant argues that the power to assess such fees may 
be pr~perly delegated to the Appellant since boards now play 
such an important part in the administration of our 
laws.(Aprellant's Brief, p. 9). However, the lower Court found 
that the legislature did not delegate the power to assess such 
fees to the Appellant (R. 245-246), so the question of whether 
the legislature could delegate such power was not involved in 
that particular determination. Thus, whether or not there is 
"ampl~ protection for any aggrieved person if the Board of 
health should impose an unreasonable or arbitrary or 
inappropriate fee" <Appellant's Brief, p. llJ is not the 
1J11estion. The legislature simply did not give the Boara the 
power to impose such fees. 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DLTLRMINLD TriAT TrlE 
APPELLANT DID NO'I' HAVc ANY IMPLIED AUTnURITY T\J EiiTABLISrl 
AN INSPECTION FEE REGULATING FOOD SERVICE ES~ABLISHMENTS. 
Appellant next contends, even if the statute did not 
specifically grant the Appellant the power to impose a fee for 
its inspections, that the power to impose such inspections 
carries with it the power to i1npose a fee to cover the costs 
thereof. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12l. Admittedly, some of the 
cases have indicated the existence of such implied fee 
assessment powers. However, those cases have dealt with electea 
governmental bodies which may be given the power to tax by the 
legislature. The Appellant in this matter is merely an 
administrative body, established pursuant to Sections 26-24-4 
and 26-24-5, Utah Code Annotated 11953), as amended. IR. 
73-74). It is not a municipal body whose members are elected by 
the people or whose me~bership is established by election by 
the people. As such, it has no power, and may be granted no 
power, to impose taxes such as a municipality may be granted. 
It has no implied taxing or police powers and is not a 
corporate authority within the meaning of Article XIII, Sec. S 
of the Constitution of Utah. See State ex. rel. ~right v. 
Standiford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1G61 11901). 
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While the legislature may provide for the execution of 
its legislative policy though administrative bodies and grant 
those bodies certain powers to determine the existence of facts 
upon which the execution of the legislative policy may depend, 
it may not transfer the essential legislative functions such 
as determining taxes. In Western Leather and Finding Company 
v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 (1935), the 
Court explained: 
The legislature is not permitted to abdicate or 
transfer to others the essential legislative function 
with which it is thus vested. 48 P. 2d at 528. 
Thus, while a city may argue that its fees imposed are 
taxes, police powers, or merely charges to offset particular 
expenses, the Appellant's imposition of charges may not legally 
fall within that taxing category. Under these circumstances, 
the distinction between a city or local governing board and a 
non-governmental appointed body becomes very important. In 
Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing Company, 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 
477 (1917), for instance, the court found that the power to 
impose a "license fee or a license tax" is within the police 
powers of the state to regulate or prohibit a business and 
tha~, inherent in those powers, is the power to tax for the 
,-,,st of such regulation. However, the Court also made it clear 
tl1at such powers arise out of the taxing powers of the 
,:,,vernmental body, which taxing powers do not exist as to the 
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Appellant in this matter. Bennion Gas & Coal cited by t 11e 
Appellant at page 12 of its brief is simply in line with the 
foregoing cases. 
Therefore, unless the imposition of the ass2ssments set 
forth in the Appellant's "Fee Schedule" in this matter come 
within the traditional concept of a fee, rather than a 
"license" fee or tax, it is invalid. 
POINT IV 
ThE DISI'J:UCI COURT Pil.OP!:.J:l.L:i D£'1ER<'ilN£D TtiAT l'tiE. 
"FEE SCtiEDUL£" SOLJGti1' TO BE IMPO;:iED B:i Tt:it, APP£LLAt.T 
COt~STl'lUTJ::D A TAX RATt:iER I'tiA·' A FEc. 
As earlier reflected, the Appellant does not challenge 
the decermination of the Court that there were no Findings of 
Fact or Conclusions of Law upon which the Court could 
reasonably determine the basis used by the Appellant in 
establishing the "Fee Schedule" involved herein, although 
Section 26-24-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, 
clearly requires the same, wherein it specifies: 
The hearings may be conducted by the board at a 
regular or special meeting, or the board may appoint 
hearing officers, who shall have power and authority 
to conduct hearings in the name of the board at a 
designated time and place. A recora or summary of 
the proceedings of any hearing shall be taken and 
filed with the board, together with findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and the order of the board 
or hearing officer. 
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Although that section further mandates, in subsection 
1SJ, that copies of those Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
anu the Order be filed along with the Answer to the Petition on 
appeal to the District Court, no such Findings or Conclusions 
were filed with the Answer of the Appellant herein, and the 
Stipulation confirms the non-existence of these crucial items 
in this matter. (R. 74-75J These Findings and Conclusions are 
for the purpose of establishing the bases of the Board in 
enacting the regulation, along with reflecting the existence of 
the constitutional and statutory bases for its enact;nent. The 
lower Court, in its "Ruling" explained the problem that such a 
fai 1 ure created. rhe Court explained: 
The purpose for findings and conclusions 
are so the basis for the board's order can be clearly 
established. While it is true that this court can 
read the documents and records and make an assumption 
as to what the board's basis for its order was, this 
court does net believe that is sufficient. The 
plaintiff is entitled to have the board follow the 
statutory procedures which includes making formal 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 228) 
The critical nature of these items is further 
r~fJected in this Court's opinion in Banberry Development Corp. 
v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah, 1981 J. That matter 
1nv0lved one of several cases involving "impact fees," 
"ouilding permit fees," and other charges imposed by various 
01ties to help offset the massive "growing pains" they were 
suffering due to high population growth in low population 
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areas. The issues as to the validity of these various fee 
imposing regulations hinged on the same constructional and 
Constitutional standards which must be considered i~ the matter 
currently before this Court. In Banberry, the Court explained: 
Since the information that must be used to assure 
that subdivision fees are within the standard of 
reasonableness is most accessible to the municipal-
ity, that body should disclose the basis of its 
c~:culations to whoever challenges the reasonable-
ness of its subdivision or hookup fees. Once that 
is done, the burden of showing failure to comply 
with the constitutional standard of reasonableness 
in this matter is on the challenger. 631 P. 2d at 
904. 
See also Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P. 2d 375 !Utah, 
1982) and Home Builders Association of Greater Salt Lake v. 
Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P. 2d 451 11972). 
Although no such findings or conclusions were prepared, 
the Appellant contends that, "The record is without dispute 
that the cost of the food service inspection progr~n is 
approximately $53,000 and that the inspection fee imposed by 
the Appellant would offset only a portion of the cost of the 
total program." IAppella11t's Brief, p. 7). It is respectfully 
submitted that this statement is not accurate. The record, as 
referred to by the Appellant, establishes, at ~ost, that the 
cost of the entire food service program is approximately 
$53,000 (R. 133). Nowhere in the record is there any reflection 
regarding the cost of the food service inspection program. 
Also, as reflected therein, the particular schedule involveu 
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h0rein would have produced $16,000, which may have been more or 
i~ss than the cost of the food service inspection progr~n. 
Throug~out the entire record, there is a distinct and 
glaring absence of any findings or conclusions regarding any of 
tl1e followi:-ig vital matters: 
(1) The costs of the inspections, as opposed to 
the other fooa service programs; 
(2) The effects of cash registers, drive-up wi:-idows, 
or other points where food is dispensed, upon the 
costs of inspections; 
(3) Ihe effects of increased numbers of seats upon the 
costs of ins2ections; 
(4) The proportionate benefit from the inspection 
progra~ to the public in general, as opposed to 
restaurants and other food service establishments; 
or even 
15) The means, if any, of dedicating funds obtained 
for the purpose of the inspection program; 
Thus, although purportedly based on costs of 
ins~e2tions, no facts appear on the record which would justify 
t'w imposition of the Fees specified under the "Fee Schedule" 
e-_·,_·c, if the record before the Board had been properly 
established with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. There 
•"'>lstcd no basis, therefore, on which it could be concluded 
- '1cit the "Fee Schedule" was anything other than a "tax" and 
,-,,uld not be imposed by the Board. 
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The general concept that an administrative boay simply 
has no power to impose a "tax", and the factors to be 
considered in distinguising between a "tax" and a "fee" was 
well set forth by the United States' Supreme Court in ~ational 
Cable Televisions Association v. Unitea States, 94 S. Ct. 1146, 
415 U.S. 336, 39 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1974). There, Congress had 
required in its Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, 
31 u. s. C. Sec. 483a: 
"It is the sense of the Congress that any work, service 
benefit, . .license, . . or similar thing of 
value or utility performed, furnished, provided, granted 
. by an Federal agency . . to or for any person 
(including ... corporations ... ) ... shall be 
self-sutaining to the full extent possible, and the 
head of each Federal agency is authorized by regulation 
. to prescribe therefor . such fee, charge, or 
price therefor . . such fee, charge, or price, if any, 
as he shall determine . . to be fair and equitable 
taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to 
the Government, value to the recipient, public policy or 
interest served, and other pertinent facts . 
Based thereon, the FCC sought to impose a revised fee 
schedule for CATV systems by estimating its direct and indirect 
costs for CATV regulation and then, while retaining its earlier 
imposed filing fees, added an annual fee for each CATV s;stem 
at $0.30 per subscriber, on the basis that this would meet its 
annual costs and approximate the "value to the recipient" as 
used in the foregoing Act. 
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The Court, with two dissenting votes, explained the 
distinction between taxation and fee levying powers, as 
follows: 
"Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which 
is the sole organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily 
and disregard benefits bestowed by the Government on a 
taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on 
property or income. A fee, however, is incident to a 
vr~Jntary act, e. g., a request that a public agency 
p.~mit an applicant to practice law or medicine or 
construct a house or run a broaacast station. The public 
agency performing those services normally may exact a 
fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on 
the applicant, not shared by other members of society." 
* * * * * 
"There is no doubt that the main function of the 
Commission is to safeguard the public interest in the 
broadcasting activities of members of the industry. If 
assessments are made by the Commission which are 
sufficient to recoup costs Lo the Commission for its 
oversight, the CATV's and other broadcasters would be 
paying not only for benefits they r~ceived but for the 
protective services rendered the public by the 
C o;nm i s s ion . " 
* * * * • 
"~hile those who operate CATV's may receive special 
benefits, we cannot be sure that the Co~nission used the 
correct standard in setting the fee. It is not enough to 
figure the total cost (direct and indirect) to the 
Commission for operating a CATV unit of SJpervision and 
then to contrive a formula that reimburses the 
Com1nission for that amount. Certainly some of the costs 
inured to the benefit of the public, unless the entire 
regulatory scheme is a failure, which we refuse to 
assume." 94 S. Ct. at 1147-1148. 
The Court then reversed the lower Court's holding of 
n,,~, validity of the FCC "fees". See also Federal Power 
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Commission v. New England Power, 415 U. S. 345, 391 L. Ed. 2d 
383, 94 S. Ct. 1151 (1974), and Stewart v. Verde River 
Irrigation Company, 68 P. 2d 329 (Ariz., 1937 ). 
The New York Courts have also employed this distinction 
regarding such matters. In Nitkin v. Administrator of Health 
Service, 91 Misc. 2d 478, 399 N.'i. Supp. 2d 162 11975), the Court 
examined a fee schedule imposed by the Board of Health which, 
in addition to the license fees otherwise imposed, imposed a 
fee upon various radioactive materials installations to cover 
the cost of its Bureau of Radiation Control. The Court 
explained: 
"It is necessary to distinguish between taxes levied in 
the form of fees and fees which are established to 
defray the specific function of the licensing or 
registration. A tax levied in the form of a fee, in 
order to be valid, must originate froir. a legislative 
body, be it the State Legislature or a local legislative 
body, pursuant to enabling legislation. The purpose of 
such a "fee" is concededly to raise revenue. The license 
"fees" for the registration of the professions are valid 
if enacted not under the police power, but rather under 
the power of taxation (People ex rel. Moskowitz v. 
Jenkins, 202 N.Y. 53, 94 N.E. 1065). A true fee on the 
other hand is a charge imposed to defray the cost of a 
particular service rendered by government to the 
individual (citing cases). 
* * * 
In dealing with a licensing or registration fee, imposed 
by an administrative agency, as in the case at bar, such 
a fee may not exceed the sum which will compensate the 
licensing or registration authority, for issuing and 
recording the license or registration and pay for the 
inspection to see to the enforcing of the licensing or 
registration provisions (Citing cases) 
* * * 
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Furthermore, such a fee cannot incluae a charge for the 
general regulation of the industry (citing cases). 
* * * 
Based thereon, that Court found the "fees" to be "taxes" and 
hence invalid. 
even where a governmental entity with the general power 
tc iffipose a "tax" is involved, the Courts are often called upon 
to det~rmine whether a particular "fee" imposed is a reasonable 
one or whether an unreasonable "tax" is involved. This Court 
has been called upon numerous times to review such matters and 
has established a substantial body of law which, Respondents 
submit, establishes that the "Fee Schedule" sought to be 
imposed in this matter is, indeed, a "tax", not a "fee." 
In ~eber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy City, 
26 Ut_ah 2d 215, 487 P. 2d 866 '1971), the first of the often 
rited "impact fee" cases, the city had raised the cost of a 
bJilJing permit fee for the conceded purpose of obtaining 
~jJitional money for the city's general fund. The Court 
exp;ained: 
"If the money collected is for a license to engage in a 
business and the proceeds therefrom are purposed mainly 
to service, regulate and police such business or 
activity, it is regarded as a license fee. On the other 
hand, if the factors just stated are minimal, and the 
money collected is mainly for raising revenue for 
general municipal pur?oses, it is properly regarded as 
the imposition of a tax, and this is so regardless of 
the terms used to describe it. In some states, where 
the power granted cities does not expressly authorize 
the collection of a license fee for the purpose of 
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ra1 s ~ c.g r.c,·:·::-o~~ 
charge fer s~c'l 
relaticns:-Jlp tc 
license~. J: i• 
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r.;::3:. -:iej t~.3.: ~\·~;, thoug'.'1 license f.==.cs 
s~f£1cient ~o cov2r s~.:~ cos:s are a necessa~; 
c0r.co;"r.i tan<: c~ t:'lt:- ~~: i :o:: po"'·er, fees in excess therec·: 
are in real1:y a fer~ o~ taxation, ~~ic~ may not be 
i~pcsej t~· t~e 21: 1· ~1:~c~: ex~ress aJthorization of t~~ 
leg~s:~:-re. '' 46- P. 2d at 867. 
"·-~Jjer t'le J:--id1 ::-:- _ :~j fa - c ~ as preser.ted to the tr ia: 
=-~r:: ~-7re ·== - f,3:-~~~ charge for a b~ilj1~; 
perrr.1t 1Nas ~~::~~asej i-:. :::·:.>? JtL-:-,;, fr.=i:r1 $12 to $112, ;..·'.-'.i:~ 
i~2reas~ ai:~~:~~-~:~ h~~ r~:a:ionsh1p tc i~=reaseJ 
costs c~ t~~ s·~r·· =e renaer~d; and moore importantly, 
~~ere t~e j~::~re~ F_;~~:s·~ ~35 to raise general reve~~~ 
~~r the City, it ~3S his op1r.1on that the increase 
?!a~ed a dis;r.)por:::~3:e a~d u~.~a1r b~rde~ on ne~ 
hc,..:.se~'J:ds in Ro· ·-..1:~~· 1 as compared to the old ones, ... 
:.~e ~a:~:e~a~~e c: :~e Cit~· gJ\'ernment; and t~at 
:c~se~~e~tli· it ~as ~1s=r1~inat~ry and constitutionall; 
... :;:e:-:-- .. ss:t:.e ~~ a:-e r.~: .~:s~os·~j t:: a1sagree o.,..·1t..-1 t'.-.3: 
C'.-.r l ste:-i.ser:, 
2 8: p. a ....... ?ro·::: C1t\' v. Pro·:c r<eat. 
"l'."ie c.::..:.··-2, ..;-::: :.:-1--.,.:;:, :3.:: :1:::.: t:,:3.':. .,,,,~_eY-e the p..:r~o:=·:=-
~f :.~e c:j: .. ~· :f c~ s:a:..:t~ is :_,J re~~~ate under t~e 
p2l1=e r2~~r, :~0 a.~-..:.1:. o~ ~ .. :.2~~se fee or tax rr..:s: 
oe reas~~at:~ 3~S m3 ~J~ ~~cePj ~~= reasonable cost o~ 
pret:a~: -.; a..-. 
ex~-::=.1ses :::::-: 
Sirr.~ l3rl·;', i :-, Sr7. 1 t ~. 
:1:~..-s- a~j t~~ reasc~atle 
S-: ::r. :s1or.." 
9C 56~, f 3 r . 
2 d 2 5 9 l : 9 5 3 1 , v..· :-. i c ~ i. 1 ·:;: : »: e ::1 a ~ ~ 3 j ~ a : .J J : -::: e , i :': ; : ::: ~ :: c :-. 
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• 3 • 
;._r.:~"3.':.....:: rr . Jc-=--:::; ... -_::;::; l~ :-i:, .. _ qJPs:iuned. Fro.T. w~at 'w'-2 h=.·:~ 
~~11, ~~ d~ 1~: ~.:.s~ t~ ~~ u~~-=rstooj as hold~:i~ t~at 
;:s:a~ r~ m~s: ~1x tees payable in all probate 
-~--:!-1:..-J.=: t~,-c s3~,·=-. ~~.at i..i.·-= do hc·ld is that the a~o':...lr.t 
~~>?s :_:-.a: .-."j t-:- ex3::t.ej rr.Js: bear soln'2 reasonable 
r- ~t~on to t~~ ~~:~~: a~j na:ure o~ t~~ s2r\·~ces 
·.:1:::-~.::j. := 1 :',~r .... ·:sc s ~=-h fees are, i:i conte:r.plation of 
' 'l ". ' t 3 x ~ ~ . " ~ 3 ,.. . ='"' 3 ~ 2 6 3 . 
:~-..5 e.c:.~:.1~r n:-:-:.--::, l'."": t,;e case at bnr, such a ba~is does 
lts f2cd s~rv1ce progra~ t~rough these assess~en~s, 
,~ costs incurred as to the particular parties 
•o t~e p'lrt; being charged t~e fee. This "de~Jnstr'lc:~ 
.. a .3·_.i;. :->-::!( . ..-:- Lour': re9arji:1g t'le valiciity of subd:;.·:isio:-i 
''~' pcrx1: or "1ffipact fees", as dis2ussed in Point I. In 
f,- __ ':.r:.i· ::iJ!'ra., tr1e court explained: 
"I'.1 re:r.cind1cq the case (Call v. City of West Jorc:iacil for 
trial on t~~ constitutionality of the ordinance as 
a:: :1·?3 (1. e., the requirement that seven percent o~ 
sJoJ:~i3ion land be dedicated), this Court ruled 
t· •~ "tnP c:ieJication should have some reasonable 
r~:at1onship to the need created by the subdivision." 
Id. ilt 1258. The Court quoted the followi'1g froin Home 
8~1~.j-rs Ass'r. cf Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas 
~-li.i_, Mo., SSS S.V.. 2d 832, 835 (1977l: 
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'If the burden cast upon the subdivider is 
reasonable attributable to his activity, then 
the requirement (of dedication or fees in lieu 
thereof) is permissible; if not, it is forbidden 
and amounts to a confiscation of private 
property in contravention of the constitutional 
prohibitions rather than a reasonable regulation 
under the police power.' 
Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to a 
higher standard of rationality than the requirement that 
its actions not be arbitrary or capricious. 
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. City of West 
Jordan, Supra., the benefits derived from the exaction 
need not accrue solely to the subdivision (614 P. 2d at 
1259); flood control and recreation are needs that 
cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the 
municipality. At the same time, the benefits derived 
from the exaction must be of "demonstrable benefit" to 
the subdivision (Id. at 1259) 631 P. 2d. at 905. 
(emphasis added). 
In Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 271 (Utah, 
1979) on reh., 614 P. 2d 1257 (Utah, 1980>, in remanding the 
matter for further hearings (the initial case arose on a motion 
for summarj judgment), the court explairied the needs for such 
further proceedings, explaining: 
"In this case the rule adopted by this Court in Call I, 
quoted ante, cannot be applied without plaintiffs being 
given the opportunity to present evidence to show that 
the dedication required of them had no reasonable 
relationship to the needs for flood control or parks and 
recreation facilities created by their subdivision, if 
any. Implicit in this rule is the requirement that if 
the subdivision generates such needs and West Jordan 
exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only fair 
that the fee so collected be used in such a way as to 
benefit demonstrably the subdivision in question. This 
is not to say that the benefit must be solely to the 
particular subdivision, but only that there be some 
demonstrable benefit to it. 614 P. 2d at 1259 (emphasis 
added l. 
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Similarly to Continental Bank v. Farmington, Infra., the 
SPrvices provided in the case at bar are not services requested 
by the Restaurants but rather, are actions mandated by state 
and local law to protect the interests of the public at large 
and are, to say the least, of questionable benefit to 
rt-'Staurants. If the inspection were refused, the restaurant 
could not operate, notwithstanding its license. Although claims 
were made by the Appellant that the inspections involve an 
educational process for the restaurants CR. 29), the 
restaurants have no alternative but to undergo those 
insp<0ctions or lose their permit to operate. This "service" 
does not benefit the restaurant, and, in fact, may directly 
damage a restaurant which fails to meet the requirements 
imposed by those inspections, whereupon its permit to operate 
could be terminated. Further, the public has no way of knowing 
when or if a restaurant was inspected and all restaurants are 
not even inspected the same number of times each year. CR. 
102). If any benefit is bestowed upon a restaurant by the 
"services" of the board of health, those benefits are only 
incidental to the public benefit obtained therefrom. See 
iBt ional Cable, Supra. 
In addition to its failure to bear a reasonable 
1~Jationship to the costs of the "service" to be rendered, and 
its failure to provide a "demonstrable benefit" to those upon 
-21-
whom the "fees" are imposed in the case at bar, the Appellant's 
"Food Service Establishment Fee Schedule" further attempts to 
divide the business of the restaurants into various component 
parts to provide additional fund raising bases. This, it is 
respectfully submitted, is contrary to the general rule, as 
expressed by McQuillan in his treatise on Municipal 
Corporations, cited in Provo City, Supra, at v. 3, Sec. 1003, 
wherein the author explains: 
"A municipal corporation cannot, by ordinance, under the 
delegated general power to tax privileges, segregate the 
several elements of right that accrue to the citizen 
under one taxable privilege, as recognized, defined and 
declared by law, and tax each of such elements as a 
separate and distinct privilege of its own creation, as, 
for exa.nple, by dividi.1g several privileges into many 
and requiring separate licenses to sell special articles 
which nece~sarily belong to on2 legal privilege, and 
which the law permits to be sold under one license. To 
express the rule in other words, power to impose a 
license tax upon a business does not authorize a 
division of the business into its constituent elements, 
parts, or incidents, and levy a separate tax on each or 
any element, part, or incident thereof." 
The restaurants, after all, are already subject to 
having a license to operate as a restaurant, fees for which are 
supposedly to cover the costs of regulating their operations or 
the restaurant. By charging one license "fee" to operate, 
where it necessarily involves the preparation and service of 
food, and then requiring another "permit fee" to sell the food 
and another "food handler fee" for persons to be authorized to 
handle the food, the cities and municipal governments, along 
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with their administrative agencies such as the Appellant 
!1e>rein, are attempting to break down the one privilege to 
operate a restaurant into a myriad of separate permits and 
fees, all for the purpose of securing additional revenue for 
their general operations. The fact that this duplicating of 
fees results, as Appellant notes in its Brief, at least in the 
unincorporated areas of the County where the food service 
establishments would be subject to licensing by Davis County 
IAprellant's Brief, p. BJ is sufficient to render the action 
im~roper under those decisions. However, the Appellant in this 
matter is the local board of health for the cities as well and, 
therefore, its "fees" would also be duplicitous in the 
incorporated areas of the county. Since the Court made no 
:inJing in this regard, however, the question of the lower 
:ourt's misinterpretation of this matter would not appear 
significant to this Appeal. 
It is very significant, however, that the "Fees" 
im~os~d in the Appellant's "Food Service Establishment Permit 
f 0 ~ Schedule" are not even dedicated to cover the expenses of 
ti1e> fooJ service progra.n of the Appellant. In fact, this i:actor 
ci I Jn·-· should be adequate to determine that the assessments 
''••cr·_·under are, in fact, "taxes" and not "fees." Although these 
~rP supposedly assessed to cover the costs of the food service 
rragrdm, the Appellant indicated at the hearing before the 
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lower Court that the "fees" are to be deposited to the county's 
general fund <Tr. 19-20, R. 135), and thereby become subject to 
the directions of the County as to whether the funds for the 
intended inspections will even be approved in the Budget of the 
Department. Under such circumstances, the Courts have indicated 
that, regardless of whether the fees are ultimately used for 
the purpo~2s initially indicated, the validity of the 
imposition must be determined as of the time it is imposed. 
In Lafferty v. Payson City, Supra., the court discussed 
Call, Banberry, and Home Builders, Supra., and noted that the 
distinction as to whether the fees were valid or invalid hinged 
on the basis that "a reasonable charge for a specific service 
is permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue 
measure is not." The court further noted: "We reaffirm that 
distinction, and agree with the district court's conclusion 
that the impact fee deposited in the cities general revenues in 
this case is an illegal tax." <Citing Weber Basin, Supra. I 
Finally, the court explained: 
"It appears from the City's answers to interrogatories 
and requests for admissions that the City has collected 
$98,000 by its impact fee, which sum the City has 
allocated for capital improvements in the following 
areas: electrical, 20%; sewage treatment plan expansion, 
60%; and water, 20%. But these allocations <some now 
expended and some not) do not alter our conclusion. Th~ 
validity of a fee imposed to augment general revenues is 
determined by its legal status at the time it is 
exacted, without regard to how the funds are later 
allocated or spent. This is not a case like those 
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involving connection fees, where the ordinances imposing 
the fees designated the collections for specific uses." 
Again, in Continental Bank and Trust Company v. 
Farmi no ton City, 599 P. 2d 1242 (Utah, 1979 J, the Court 
reviewed a license fee imposed on Lagoon by the City of 
Far~1n3ton, ostensibly with an intent to applf the increased 
r~v~nues to upgrade the services to Lagoon. However, the court 
"Tne trial court specifically found that the amount of 
revenue anticipated from license fee bore no relation to 
the costs of services provided Lagoon. Farmington spoke 
extensively for the need of upgraded services to Lagoon, 
indicating an intent on the part of the city to apply 
revenues to that end. Beyond very general reference in 
the preamble of the ordinance, however, no dedication of 
revenue funds to that purpose is made. Moreover, 
evidence appears in the trial transcript tendin3 to 
indicate that the tax was imposed with an eye to 
municipal purposes of a much broader sweep." 599 P. 2d 
at 1246, (emphasis added). 
Based upon these factors, the court found that the 
ordinance was invalid, explaining: 
"fhe effective result of the ordinance, as presently 
constituted, is the imposition upon a single enterprise 
of a tax, the revenues of which could at the discretion 
of t~e city, be devoted to any municipal corporate 
purt_:iosP." 
* * * * * 
"The conclusion i3 inescapable that a situation such as 
the one at hand, where a municipality imposes a 
potentia~ly crippling tax on a single business for the 
benefit of the community as a whole, coupled with vague 
promises of improved services which the business has not 
been guaranteed, and to a large extent, does not need, 
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presents such a case of abuse of taxing power." 599 P. 
2d at 1246. 
It is respectfully submitted that, in the case at bar, 
that, as the lower Court determined, there is no reasonable 
relationship reflected in the record between the "fees" imposed 
and the costs of the services rendered nor of any demonstrable 
benefit to the restaurants in return for such "fee". In fact, 
the contrary directly appears. Further, since there is no 
dedication of the funds for use in even operating the food 
service program of the Appellant, there is only one sure result 
from the imposition of the fee. .the increase cf the general 
revenues of the county. As such, the "fee" is, in fact, a tax 
which may not be imposed by the Appellant herein and, 
therefore, the lower Court properly determined that the "Fee 
Schedule" was invalid, and would have been invalid even if the 
proper Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law had been entered 
by the Board reflecting the factors which the Appellant now 
claims constituted the bases for the adoption of the "Fee 
Schedule." 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents respectfully submit that, based upon 
the foregoing that this Court should dismiss this Appeal or 
summarily affirm the Judgment of the lower Court on the grounds 
that the Appellant has not appealed from the Judgment of the 
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lower Court herein and, in fact, has conceded that Judgment to 
to·c correct. Rather, the Appellant seeks only to have certain 
:1ndings reviewed which would not affect the Judgment. 
111 the event the Court deter.mines to review the 
questions posed as to those certain findings, the Respondents 
respectfully submit that the findings and conclusions of that 
:ourt we:. correct in each instance and that, in fact, the 
BoarJ did not have the statutory, nor the implied, authority to 
impose the fees sought to be imposed in the Appellant's "Fee 
SchedJle," even if it had followed all statutory procedures. 
Further, it is submitted that the "fee" which the Appellants 
sought to impose was, actually, an invalid "tax", based upo!l 
t~e fact that the record discloseb: (1) no reasonable 
r~lationship between the costs of the inspections to particular 
food service operations and the Permit Fee Schedule sought to 
b~ imposed; ( 2) no demonstrable benefit to the restaurants by 
r~as~n of the inspections; and (31 no dedication of the funds 
received to cover the expenses of the inspections. Since the 
Appellant is not a body with the power to impose a tax, even if 
a0thorized by the legislature, the lower Court properly 
ajJ-idged the Appellant's "Fee Schedule" to be i!lvalib and 
r~<trd1ned it from any further imposition of fees thereunder 
i:ici Ordered a return of any fees collected thereunder. This 
~uJrt should, therefore, affirm the Judgment of the Lower Court 
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and determine its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be 
proper in all respects. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of August, 1983. 
By: 
ATKIN & ANDERSON 
Gary E. Atkin 
Attorneys for Respondents 
185 South State Street, # 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-2552 
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